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During Hayes' tenure as president, the dollar-centered 
Bretton  Woods  system of fixed  exchange rates 
matured,  then collapsed, prompting a transition to 
floating exchange rates.  In this address, Hayes dis- 
cusses the development of international cooperation in 
foreign exchange market intervention  and the pros- 
pects for reform of the international monetary system. 
He recommends that countries work  together to ensure 
exchange rate stability, orderly balance-of-payments 
adjustment, and the financing of imbalances resulting 
from the first energy crisis. 
The International Monetary 
System—Retrospect and 
Prospect by Alfred  E.  Hayes 
Today I would like to share with you a look at the 
development  of the international monetary system 
since World War II, together with a brief attempt to see 
what may lie ahead. Let me state at the outset, how- 
ever, that visibility has rarely been lower than it is now. 
The  whole world economy is being subjected to strains 
greater than would have been imaginable a few years 
ago. And,  as you know, the International  Monetary 
Fund's Committee of 201 found it impossible to give the 
recent annual meeting of the Fund's governors a full 
1The  Committee  on Reform of the International Monetary  System  and 
Related Issues," better known as the Committee  of 20, was created 
by  the Board of Governors  of  the IMF in 1972 to study proposals  for 
the reform of  the international  monetary  system. 
Address delivered before the Business  Forum  and the Money 
Marketeers,  New York University,  New York, November  13, 1974. 
blueprint of a new system. In light of this very uncer- 
tain state of affairs, it is especially hard to distinguish 
those tendencies  that are likely to be embodied  in 
whatever new system will emerge some years in the 
future. However,  I think  the effort is worth making. 
My vantage point for these observations is a favor- 
able one. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is 
the operating arm of the Federal Reserve System in 
the international area  and we participate in the Federal 
Open Market Committee's formulation of policies. The 
Bank also acts as agent for the Treasury in carrying 
out most of its foreign exchange  and other  international 
transactions. We enjoy  close relations with virtually all 
the central banks and other monetary authorities in the 
world. 
In our vaults are $17 billion of gold  (valued at the 
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authorities—the  largest concentration of gold in the 
world—as well as the  bulk of their holdings of U.S. 
Treasury securities, $60 billion, well over 10 percent of 
the total U.S. public debt. A very large proportion of 
their dollar payments pass through our books, and last 
year the security transactions we carried out for them 
came to almost $300  billion,  about  three times the 
huge total effected for the System Open  Market 
Account. 
Since my coming to the Bank in 1956, our interna- 
tional transactions  have expanded greatly in volume 
and our overall international activities have grown  in 
importance. This is one area of our responsibilities that 
over recent years has involved much of the time and 
attention of the Bank's top executives. One aspect of 
this involvement that deserves particular  attention is 
the development of  the Federal Reserve swap network. 
The early years of the Federal Reserve swap 
• network 
This network has turned out to be a major contribution 
to the international monetary system. In general, it is 
fair to say that the Federal Reserve swap network has 
proved its worth under both fixed-rate and managed 
float arrangements and will probably remain an indis- 
pensable feature of whatever may be the future inter- 
national financial system. 
I don't have time to go into the  mechanics of the 
swap transactions, but the essence of the operation is 
a renewable short-term credit of, say, 90 days' duration 
from one central bank to another. Before the inception 
of the  Federal Reserve swap network in 1962, such 
central  bank swap transactions  had  been arranged 
from time to time on an ad hoc basis, notably during 
the run on sterling in 1961. 
In early 1962, the Federal Reserve, with the strong 
support of the U.S. Treasury, concluded that there 
would  be a continuing and probably increasing need 
for central banks to help each other out by providing 
short-term credits to partner central banks whose cur- 
rencies might come under selling pressure from time to 
time for a broad range of reasons,  from seasonal weak- 
ness to unwarranted speculative attacks. It seemed to 
us in the Federal Reserve that the best way of dealing 
with this problem was to arrange well in advance for 
reciprocal lines of credit linking up the  major central 
banks in the world with the Federal Reserve, whose 
currency, the dollar, was the intervention currency for 
our foreign central bank partners. We felt, and I think 
correctly, that by setting up these reciprocal lines of 
credit  in a highly visible way, and  in advance rather 
than waiting until they were actually needed, we could 
provide an assured reinforcement of the international 
financial system. I hasten to add that neither the Fed- 
eral Reserve nor any of its central bank partners in this 
endeavor ever had any illusion that the swap network 
could do more than provide such a reinforcement. After 
all, the continued operation of any stable international 
financial system depends fundamentally upon the abil- 
ity of the United States and other  major trading nations 
to maintain reasonable equilibrium in their balance of 
payments. 
From April 1962 until the closing of the gold window 
in August  1971,  the  Federal  Reserve swap network 
grew from a single $50 million swap arrangement with 
the Bank of France to a $11.7 billion credit system 
embracing 14 central banks and the Bank for Interna- 
tional Settlements. During this decade, many countries 
saw their balance of payments swing from surplus into 
deficit and back. As various currencies came under 
temporary selling pressure,  the swap  network  was 
called upon to make available an overall total of $27.1 
billion of swap credits. Of this total, $11.8 billion were 
drawings  by the Federal  Reserve, and  $15.4 billion 
drawings by our partners. In general, the swap credits 
accomplished their purpose of enabling  countries to 
ride through speculative squalls and other short-term 
difficulties, and the repayment record was generally 
excellent. 
The defense of sterling in the 1960s 
Of the many financial events of the 1960s in which the 
swap network  played a role, the defense of sterling 
merits special attention.  From the restoration of con- 
vertibility in 1958 until Britain's devaluation of sterling 
in 1967, sterling was the currency that caused by far 
the greatest concern in financial circles. Sterling's mal- 
ady was not a steady one, for it was punctuated by 
periods of strong recovery and restored faith  —  only to 
be  followed by new difficulties. I shall not try to analyze 
the reasons for sterling's recurrent weakness. But since 
it had a reserve currency role second only to that of 
the dollar, its fate involved the whole monetary system 
and was a matter of keen interest to other countries. 
There was wide recognition of the danger that a deval- 
uation of the pound would  prove to be a prelude to 
speculative attacks against the dollar. As it turned out, 
these fears were  borne out almost immediately after 
sterling was actually devalued. In recognition of this 
interdependence,  the Federal  Reserve  participated 
with other major central banks in the defense of ster- 
ling. Naturally only the country whose currency is in 
question can make  the basic political decision  to 
devalue or revalue. But as long as the will to defend 
the sterling parity continued within the United Kingdom, 
I believe our concerted efforts in its behalf were thor- 
oughly justified. 
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land  on the Federal  Reserve swap network  and on 
other ad hoc central bank credit arrangements fluctu- 
ated quite widely  as sterling moved up and down. The 
reliance  on central  bank credit did not obscure the 
question  of exchange  rate adjustment.  In fact, six 
months before the devaluation of sterling in November 
1967, the Bank of England had completely paid off all 
outstanding central bank debt. Incidentally, in the case 
of the dollar, the major buildup of swap indebtedness  of 
the Federal Reserve, totaling more than $3 billion at 
the time  of the closing of the  gold window, was incurred 
only during the very last weeks of dollar convertibility. 
The inconvertible dollar 
The relative trade position of the United  States had 
begun to deteriorate in the late 1950s  and early 1960s, 
and vast sums were already moving abroad for invest- 
ment to take advantage of faster growing markets and 
lower costs and to jump Common Market barriers. But 
it was  the sharp  acceleration of U.S. inflation after 
mid-1965, together with the sterling devaluation, that 
really brought dollar convertibility  into serious doubt. 
Whether or not the decision of August 1971 could have 
been avoided or deferred through timely  measures by 
all the major trading nations before the final specula- 
tive wave struck the dollar will be debated for a long 
time. In any event, cutting the tie between the dollar 
and gold had a traumatic effect on the international 
monetary system from which it has not yet recovered. 
Because of its primacy as a trading and investment 
currency, the dollar had become by far the principal 
medium for official intervention in the exchange mar- 
kets and also by far the largest component of  monetary 
reserves except for gold. 
With all respect for the valiant and painstaking 
efforts to establish the SDR as an acceptable substi- 
tute, it cannot take the dollar's place as the chief vehi- 
cle for official intervention. Moreover,  it must be 
acknowledged that gold still represents the most cher- 
ished form of monetary  reserves in  a great many 
countries. 
After the  tie to gold was cut, it came to be  quite 
widely held that we need feel no concern as  to how low 
the dollar might sink in the  exchange markets, even 
under periodic speculative attacks, because a cheaper 
dollar would assure a better  competitive trade position 
for U.S. products. The philosophy of "benign neglect" 
overlooked  the serious inflationary impact that a depre- 
ciation of the dollar could have, and indeed did have, 
on the domestic price level. It also neglected the fact 
that the bulk of the world's trade was denominated in 
dollars, the largest financial markets were dollar mar- 
kets, and most countries of the world still looked to the 
dollar as their main monetary anchor. An anchor that 
bobbed about wildly in the heavy seas was not very 
helpful. Furthermore, this philosophy posed the danger 
of encouraging a spirit of competitive exchange rate 
adjustments  and  monetary  controls,  which  if it had 
developed, could have destroyed much of the fabric of 
economic cooperation that had been woven so care- 
fully in the years following World War II. 
The Federal Reserve swap network lay dormant for 
slightly more than a year after the closure of the gold 
window while the negotiation and launching of the 
Smithsonian  Agreement2 got under way. By. July of 
1972, however, it had become clear that the United 
States could not leave the entire burden of supporting 
the Smithsonian dollar rate to foreign governments, 
and so the Federal Reserve resumed intervention in 
the exchange markets, again relying upon the swap 
network to meet its needs for foreign currencies. 
In early 1973, another tidal wave of speculation 
swept through the exchange markets, and in February 
1973 it was decided to devalue the dollar for the sec- 
ond time. A modest amount of Federal Reserve swap 
debt incurred just prior to the devaluation was quickly 
repaid, but intervention was not resumed as both the 
United States and the major European  countries 
agreed  in  March 1973 to let the dollar float.  Unfor- 
tunately, the dollar did not float, but sank precipitously, 
as speculative pressures cumulated. By early July 1973 
exchange  trading in the dollar was grinding to a stand- 
still. At this critical juncture, the Federal Reserve was 
again called upon by both the U.S. and European gov- 
ernments  to resume exchange market intervention, 
backed up by a major enlargement of the swap network 
to nearly $18 billion. (The total now stands at almost 
$20 billion.) The very announcement  of this policy shift 
from a free to a managed float of the dollar brought 
about an immediate  strong  recovery of dollar rates. 
From then on the tide began to turn. 
Over the succeeding year, Federal Reserve interven- 
tion to support the dollar amounted to somewhat more 
than $1  billion,  mainly  financed  by drawings  on  the 
swap network, all of which were repaid in less than six 
months' time. Today, as the  markets realize that the 
authorities are fully prepared to show their presence, 
violent  speculation has subsided and exchange mar- 
kets are orderly. The oil embargo and skyrocketing oil 
prices have, of course, contributed to sizable swings in 
the exchange rates over the past year. 
2The Smithsonian  Agreement  of December  1971 realigned currencies 
by devaluing the dollar  against gold and revaluing  major foreign 
currencies against the dollar. The Agreement  also established the 
freedom of  countries to declare central exchange rates against 
foreign currencies rather than parities against gold and provided for 
a  wider band of permissible  exchange rate fluctuations  around 
central rates. 
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The quadrupling of the  price of oil has  altered  the 
whole international financial outlook more violently than 
any other event in many decades. I need not remind 
this audience that the magnitudes involved in the pro- 
spective shift of monetary reserves to the oil-producing 
countries  really stagger the imagination.  No wonder 
there is widespread pessimism about devising arrange- 
ments that can handle such flows. Even the most suc- 
cessful  arrangements would still mean overwhelming 
burdens of debt service for many countries, both devel- 
oping and developed, that could not be carried indefi- 
nitely. This prospect underlines the great need to bring 
about—through cooperative measures by oil producers 
and consumers alike—a reduction of this huge imbal- 
ance in international payments as rapidly as possible, 
with a view to its elimination in the foreseeable future. 
This may seem a dreamer's objective, but I see it as 
the only way out and I would hope that the  joint efforts 
necessary toward this end will get under way before 
too long. The aim should be a two-pronged reduction 
of  the imbalance: to reduce the volume of oil payments, 
and in the longer  run, to speed up the oil-exporting 
countries' purchases of goods and services. 
Regarding the gross flow of oil payments, much has 
been said of the need to achieve a lower level of oil 
prices, and I endorse this aim. I would also like to see 
a greater emphasis on effective measures to conserve 
fuel, however unpopular  they might be, and on the 
development of alternative energy sources. 
The other side of the imbalance, the inability of the 
oil-exporting countries to spend their  newly found 
wealth promptly on imports from  abroad, is clearly even 
more difficult to tackle and has to be viewed in a longer 
context. A great deal of skepticism prevails regarding 
the possibility of ever  raising the level  of the oil- 
exporting countries' imports anywhere near the value 
of their oil receipts. Their imports, however, are already 
rising at a surprisingly rapid rate. And for the future, 
massive international programs of economic develop- 
ment  not just in individual countries,  but in entire 
regions, such as the Middle East, should make it possi- 
ble for the oil-consuming countries to make the trans- 
fers of resources  necessary  to pay for the oil they 
require. At the same time, of course, such programs 
would  help the oil-exporting countries speed  their 
efforts to utilize their underground resources for the 
benefit of their coming generations. 
In the meantime, while the large imbalances con- 
tinue, the world must find better ways for financing 
them.  So far,  private  markets and institutions  have 
taken care of most of the oil payments without undue 
difficulty. But it would be a bad mistake to assume that 
they can continue to do so much longer. For one thing, 
the oil payments are now running at a much higher rate 
than even in the first half of the year, apparently at 
least 50 percent higher.  No  doubt  the commercial 
banking system will retain arole, but from  now on a 
variety  of public channels will have to be relied upon to 
an increasing extent. This will be necessary if we are 
to avoid serious dislocations in  the weaker—but  not 
necessarily the smallest  — nations,  and the conse- 
quences these would entail for the trading and invest- 
ing world in general. 
The term "recycling" has become very popular  in 
recent  months. To me it is a misnomer—or worse—for 
the problem at hand. It tends to conceal the basic 
question of who should assume the credit risk in lend- 
ing to the countries beset with economic difficulties. 
Notwithstanding the risks and difficulties involved, if 
the United States receives a large share of the invest- 
ment flows  from the oil producers, as a good many 
market observers think  quite likely, careful thought will 
have to be given to means of channeling some portion 
of these flows to less fortunate countries experiencing 
big oil deficits  — and this will call for political awareness 
as much as technical skill. 
More fundamentally, the oil-exporting countries will 
have to take on themselves an increasing share of the 
risk of the financing of the oil deficits through bilateral 
credits and grants. There are already some encourag- 
ing signs to this effect. These countries will probably 
also wish to undertake a growing volume of the oil- 
deficit  financing  through  international  organizations. 
There would thus seem to be a major role in the  financ- 
ing of the oil deficits for these organizations, such as 
the  International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
and their affiliates, or even for new bodies. 
Reflections  on Bretton Woods 
Before I attempt to look further ahead at the prospects 
for reshaping the international monetary  system,  I 
should like to reflect on Bretton Woods. 
In the last few years, views as to the merits of greater 
"flexibility" in the international monetary system have 
exhibited substantial swings. The Bretton Woods sys- 
tem, based on mutually agreed and preestablished par 
values for all currencies, embodying a clear code of 
international monetary behavior, monitored and guided 
by the  International Monetary Fund and shared in by 
all the principal countries of the non-Communist  world, 
was widely disparaged after the closing of the gold 
window in August 1971. For a while it was the conven- 
tional wisdom to welcome a brave new world in which 
exchange rates would no longer be instruments of eco- 
nomic policy but would be left largely to seek their  own 
levels in the market. This new world, it was thought, 
would  no longer have to fear exchange "crises" in 
32  FRBNY Quarterly Review/Special Issue: 75th Anniversary which the dams finally  break after  large-scale efforts  of 
central banks to maintain untenable rates prove futile. 
Moreover, it was claimed, governments  would no longer 
have to compromise domestic  economic  policies to 
protect exchange rates.  Inflationary consequences of 
large payments imbalances could be avoided, as sur- 
plus countries would no longer face the need for huge 
support operations. At the same time, deficit countries 
could escape having to restrain domestic spending to 
stem vast losses of reserves. 
However,  it didn't work out that way. In the first place, 
during the brief periods since •the end  of Bretton 
Woods when exchange markets were on their own, it 
was not surprising that speculative pressures tended to 
cumulate and exchange rates were driven far from any 
likely equilibrium levels. Thus serious exchange trou- 
bles were not banished but took the form of violent 
movements  of exchange  rates rather than violent 
movements of exchange reserves. To be sure, surplus 
countries did not have to face the inflation potential of 
unwanted reserve gains. But excessive exchange rate 
swings aggravated inflation in deficit countries without 
bringing fully corresponding  price moderation to the 
surplus countries whose exchange rates were appre- 
ciating. The experience also showed that the hope of 
freeing domestic policies from external constraint was 
largely illusory. 
In any event, after the Bretton Woods system was 
abandoned, it became clear that exchange rates were 
still a matter of major political and economic impor- 
tance in every country. Hardly any government or its 
monetary authority was willing for very long to.let its 
own  currency float entirely in response to market 
forces. In fact, since March 1973 (when floating began) 
official intervention in the exchange markets to mode- 
rate exchange rate fluctuations has totaled  some $52 
billion by the Group of Ten countries alone. 
Thus, in my view, the recent experience has under- 
lined some  of the positive aspects of the Bretton 
Woods system. By providing an international  framework 
for exchange rate changes, with the backing of sub- 
stantial amounts of credit, both automatic and discre- 
tionary, that system made it possible for such changes 
to be made without international discord and with a 
minimum of restrictions on the international movements 
of goods, services, and capital. To be sure, as time 
went on, exchange rate stability sometimes turned out 
to be rigidity. It is, of course, a truism that no interna- 
tional  system can either compensate for the inability  of 
sovereign member states to manage their affairs prop- 
erly or offset their unwillingness to pool some of their 
sovereignty for the benefit of a wider  community. More 
fundamentally, what brought the Bretton Woods system 
to an end were the asymmetries  in the adjustment pro- 
cess that increasingly came to the fore: on the one 
hand, the asymmetry between  the strong pressures 
exerted on debtor countries and the weaker pressures 
felt by creditor countries, and on the other hand, the 
asymmetry in the meeting of deficits of reserve  cur- 
rency countries and countries without such currencies. 
But as we look ahead, these shortcomings should not 
blind us to the old system's very considerable  contribu- 
tions to an unprecedented growth in world commerce. 
Prospects for the international monetary system 
As  I said at the  outset, the  past year's events have 
made it even more difficult than before to foresee the 
shape of tomorrow's monetary system. I was always of 
the view  that, once the key element of the postwar sys- 
tem no longer existed, that is, the link between the dol- 
lar and gold, it would not prove possible to agree in 
advance to a complete new system. Rather it would be 
necessary to rebuild gradually on an ad  hoc, experi- 
mental basis, with various blocks of the new system 
being put in place as they proved their worth. The oil 
problem merely strengthens my conviction in  this 
regard. If asked to mention specifics of  the system that 
will eventually develop, about all I can do is to cite a 
few principles that I think must be adhered to and to 
point out some areas that call for special attention and 
study. 
We need agreed-upon rules of conduct and balanced 
pressures to help enforce them. The area of exchange 
rate policies is crucial to the well-being and growth of 
the world economy,  and fortunately it is one where we 
can  begin promptly, building upon our recent experi- 
ences. A country's exchange rate is too vital an ele- 
ment of its economic welfare to be left in the hands of 
often capricious exchange markets. At  the same time, it 
affects other countries as well, particularly among the 
major trading nations. As a result, exchange rate rela- 
tionships bear  the seed of conflicting national interests. 
Unless these are reconciled, no monetary system can 
function  properly. A framework  of greater exchange 
rate stability is one that lends itself best to such a rec- 
onciliation. But reasonable  exchange  rate stability 
should  be a primary aim in  its own right. With it, 
exchange markets can function better, world trade and 
payments  have a more assured basis on which to grow, 
and national governments  have the opportunity to carry 
out domestic policies in a climate of relative certainty. 
And it must not be forgotten that such stability is in the 
interest of the developing countries, as well as of the 
major industrial powers. The  developing countries have 
in  recent years been seriously exposed  to violent 
swings of exchange rates that  were not of their making. 
No wonder they have been quite  vocal  in  urging a 
return to a system in which there is some reasonably 
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currencies. 
As we move toward greater exchange rate stability, 
and I believe we are doing so, we must not overlook 
the need for orderly procedures for changes in rates. 
The balance-of-payments  adjustments that are neces- 
sary as the world economy  grows and develops, at 
times at a different pace in individual countries, cannot 
always be made through domestic policies alone. But 
to give such policies a chance to be effective requires 
international credit  lines that  can  be  utilized as and 
when needed. The IMF quota facilities, the Common 
Market's Fund,  the Federal Reserve swaps, and other 
central bank credit lines are essential components of 
an orderly monetary system. 
Thus, as  I  see it,  exchange rate stability,  orderly 
balance-of-payments  adjustments, and a solid network 
of international credit arrangements are some of the 
buildings blocks for the new system. Beyond this, a 
multitude of problems such as the role of multinational 
corporations and banks, surveillance of the Eurocur- 
rency markets, better  coordination of national monetary 
policies, and the plight of  the poorest among the devel- 
oping countries need thorough attention. 
Progress on all these fronts is unlikely to be as rapid 
as we would like. Unfortunately,  the oil problem and the 
worldwide disease of virulent inflation,  and now the 
fears of recession, enhance the risk that short-sighted 
nationalistic tendencies might come to the fore. 
Of one thing I am certain, however. The world we live 
in is one where interdependence is a vital reality that 
we cannot  afford to overlook. We  must bend every 
effort to find cooperative and durable answers to our 
major economic problems. In the specialized area of 
financial and monetary cooperation, the world's mone- 
tary authorities have made a good start in the past few 
decades. In particular, I can attest from personal expe- 
rience that central bankers have  learned to work 
together intimately and effectively in matters involving 
the exchange markets. I see every reason to believe 
that effective means of international cooperation will be 
found in this very difficult new world we face  today. 
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